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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Grover Rye, Jr. pied guilty to failure to register as a sex offender preserving his 
right to challenge the district court's finding that Idaho Code§ 18-8309(1) requires a sex 
offender to notify the sheriff in the district the offender had previously registered of any 
change in residence, within two days of changing residence, even if the offender 
becomes homeless or leaves the State. Mindful of the plain language of the relevant 
statutes, Mr. Rye asserts the district court's statutory interpretation is in error. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The State filed an Information alleging that Mr. Rye committed the crime of failure 
to register as a sex offender, by "fail[ing] to update his registration information within two 
working days as required by statute ... ", and an Information Part II alleging that Mr. Rye 
is a persistent violator. (R., pp.18-19, pp.24-25.) The district court was asked to 
determine 1 whether a convicted sex offender who had previously registered at a specific 
residence, but then subsequently leaves that residence and became homeless, is 
required to register within two days of leaving the residence pursuant to Idaho law, or 
whether they have seven days to do so. (R., pp.34-36; Tr., p.5, L.4 - p.28, L.2.) 
In arguing that an offender in such a situation is not required to notify the sheriff 
of any change in address within two working days, counsel for Mr. Rye asserted the 
following: 
As you're probably well aware, there are periodic notifications and 
registrations that anyone on the -- that is required to register has to 
1 Mr. Rye did not file any written motion and neither party filed any briefing on the 
matter; rather, the issue appears to have been brought to the district court's attention 
during a pretrial conference. (Tr., p.5, L.4 - p.6, L.6.) 
1 
complete. Now, periodically my client has had to go through and 
acknowledge the registration requirements. And there's 13 separate lines 
here that they have to acknowledge. 2 
There is nothing in there that deals with what you're supposed to do 
in the case - in case you are homeless. The closest we get to is in item 
No. 13, which reads, an offender who does not provide a physical 
residence address at the time of registration must report in person once 
every seven days to the sheriff in the county in which he resides. That 
requirement appears to come from section 18-8308(4). 
The requirement - well, in 18-8309, to register, or to - within two 
days - and it reads in the statute, after the change. So whatever the 
change is, within two days after the change to a registrant's name, street 
address, or actual address, employment, or student status, that there -
the person required to register must notify of the change. 
Well, if a person has become homeless, what is the change? Just 
reporting homeless? It seems the better rationale for all of these is the 
person who is without a residence that he can claim as a permanent 
resident, should fall under the requirement under 18-1808(4 ), that he 
report in person each and every day with the sheriff - or once every seven 
days with the sheriff. And the sheriff then is required under the same code 
section to go out once a month and check on the address. 
It seems a little unreasonable or illogical for a person that is 
homeless, is relying on, you know, assistance where he can, perhaps, you 
know, spending a few days in the park, maybe spending one night on 
some person's couch, to within two days after a change to go report that, if 
he may have moved a couple more times since then. To me it makes a lot 
more sense to require homeless people to meet the verification 
requirements under 18-8308(4 ). 
But that's if it's a voluntary change. I think the evidence in this case 
is going to suggest - show that my client did not leave the Lighthouse3 
voluntarily, that he was asked to leave. But that, I don't think, really is an 
issue for registration purposes. It's if he has made a change in his 
permanent address, yes, then the two working days requires. If he's 
becomes homeless, I think the better reading is that he required - be 
required to report to the sheriff once every seven days in person. 
(Tr., p.19, L.23 - p.22, L.3.) 
2 Although it is not entirely clear from the record, it appears that that "13 separate lines" 
counsel for Mr. Rye is referring to is a document provided by the sheriff to sex offenders 
explaining the registration requirements. (See Tr., p.58, L.25 - p.59, L.22.) 
2 
The district court noted that the parties did not dispute that Mr. Rye had been 
residing and registering at the Lighthouse, and then he left. (Tr., p.24, Ls.11-15.) The 
court found that the reason for his leaving the Lighthouse was immaterial. (Tr., p.24, 
Ls.15-19.) The court found that the seven day requirement under I.C. § 18-8308(4) only 
applies "if, at the first instance, they do not have a residence address," but because 
Mr. Rye had a residence and then left, he was required under I.C. § 18-8309 to appear 
in person at the sheriff's office and inform them within two days of leaving the 
Lighthouse that he was not longer residing there. (Tr. p.24, L.20 - p.27, L.12.) The 
court was then asked to determine how long a person has to register if they leave the 
and the court again read I.C. § 18-8309 to require offender to inform the 
sheriff of the county they had been registering it of any change in address, whether the 
move was to another county or out of state, within two days of leaving their registered 
residence. (Tr., p.28, L.3 - p.30, L.16.) In its written order, the district court found the 
following 
[U]nder § 18-8309 when an individual registers but then leaves his/her 
registered address, the offender shall appear within two (2) working days 
to notify the sheriff. Thus, upon leaving the Lighthouse, the Defendant 
would have had two (2) days to inform the Canyon County Sheriff's Office 
he was no longer living at the Lighthouse and give them an address or 
location where he was staying. If the defendant did not have an address 
to go to, under § 18-8308(4 ), the Defendant must go to the sheriff every 
seven days to check in. 
(R., pp.37-38.) 
Mr. Rye entered into a plea agreement with the State pleading guilty to failure to 
register as a sex offender, preserving his right to appeal the district court's interpretation 
of the relevant statutes, and was free to argue the length and terms of his sentence; in 
3 It appears that counsel for Mr. Rye is referring to the Lighthouse Rescue Mission in 
Nampa, Idaho. 
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exchange, the State dismissed the persistent violator allegation and to 
recommended a fixed term of no greater than one and one-half years, and was free to 
argue an appropriate indeterminate term. (R., pp.39-51; Tr., p.32, L.4 - p.49, L.18.) 
During the sentencing hearing, the State requested the court impose a unified term of 
ten years, with one and one-half years fixed, while counsel for Mr. Rye requested the 
court "impose a judgment in the case, a sentence of incarceration, but suspend that and 
place him on probation." (Tr., p.58, Ls.8-17, p.62, Ls.7-9.) The district court found that 
Mr. Rye "probably did not intend to break the law in this particular case" and sentenced 
him to a suspended unified term of three years, with one and one-half years fixed, and 
placed him on probation for a period of three years. (R., pp.60-62; Tr., p.67, L.1 - p.68, 
L.16.) Mr. Rye filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., pp.63-65.) 
4 
ISSUE 
Did the district court misinterpret Idaho Code § 18-8309 as requiring Mr. Rye to notify 
the county sheriff within two days of leaving his residence, even though Mr. Rye had 
become homeless and/or left the State? 
5 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Misinterpreted Idaho Code§ 18-8309 As Requiring Mr. Rye To Notify 
The County Sheriff Within Two Days Of Leaving His Residence, Even Though Mr. Rye 
Had Become Homeless And/Or Left The State 
A. Introduction 
Mindful of the plain language of the relevant statutes, Mr. Rye asserts that the 
district court erroneously concluded that, pursuant to I.C. § 18-8309, he was required to 
notify the Canyon County Sheriff's office that he was no longer living at the Lighthouse, 
within two days of leaving. 
B. The District Court Misinterpreted Idaho Code§ 18-8309 As Requiring Mr. Rye To 
Notify The County Sheriff Within Two Days Of Leaving His Residence 
Although no evidence was submitted for the court's consideration, the parties 
agreed that Mr. Rye was required to register as a sex offender, that he left his residence 
at the Lighthouse, and that he did not inform the Canyon County Sheriff of this change 
in residence. Mr. Rye asserts that, because he became homeless and/or left the State 
of ldaho4, under Idaho law he was not required to inform the Sheriff of this change of 
residence status within two days, as alleged in the Information. 'The interpretation of a 
statute is also a question of law this Court reviews de novo." State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 
863, 865 (2011 ). 
Idaho Code § 18-8303(15) defines "residence" under the "Sex Offender 
Registration Notification and Community Right-to-know Act" as "the offender's present 
4 The parties did not submit any evidence as to where Mr. Rye had gone to after he left 
the Lighthouse, during the hearing requesting the court to interpret the relevant statutes. 
(Tr., p.15, L.4 - p.30, L.16.) In the "Defendant's Version," in the Presentence 
Investigation Report, Mr. Rye is quoted as saying '"I was kicked out of my place o[f] 
residence on [M]arch 11. I left Idaho that very night to go to [N]evada. I was gone a 
couple of weeks and came back on a [F]riday. Easter weekend."' 
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place of abode." I.C. §§ 18-8301, 18-8303(15). Idaho Code§ 18-8308(4) reads as 
follows: 
(4) A sexual offender who does not provide a physical residence address 
at the time of registration shall report, in person, once every seven (7) 
days to the sheriff of the county in which he resides. Each time the 
offender reports to the sheriff, he shall complete a form provided by the 
department that includes the offender's name, date of birth, social security 
number and a detailed description of the location where he is residing. 
The sheriff shall visit the described location at least once each month to 
verify the location of the offender. 
I.C. § 18-8308(4). However, Idaho Code§ 18-8309(1) reads, 
If an offender subject to registration changes his or her name, street 
address or actual address, employment or student status, the offender 
shall appear in person within two (2) working days after the change at the 
office of the sheriff of the county where the offender is required to register 
and notify the sheriff of all changes in the information required for that 
offender in the sex offender registry. Provided however, nonresidents 
employed in this jurisdiction in counseling, coaching, teaching, supervising 
or working with minors in any way, regardless of the period of 
employment, shall register before the commencement of such 
employment. Within three (3) working days after receipt of the notice, the 
sheriff shall notify the department of the changed information and the 
department shall notify all other counties and jurisdictions in which the 
offender is required to register. An offender satisfies the notification 
requirements set forth in this subsection if he or she appears in another 
jurisdiction in which registration is required and notifies that jurisdiction of 
the changed information. 
I.C. § 18-8309(1 ). 
As noted above, Mr. Rye was subject to registration, had a residence, and then 
left his residence. Mindful of the plain language contained in I.C. § 18-8309(1 ), he 
adopts his trial counsel's argument that "It seems the better rationale for all of these is 
the person who is without a residence that he can claim as a permanent resident, 
should fall under the requirement under 18-1808(4), that he report in person each and 
every day with the sheriff- or once every seven days with the sheriff." (Tr., p.20, L.23 -
7 
p.21, L.5.) Therefore, he 
statutes. 
that the district court misinterpreted the relevant 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Rye respectfully requests that this Court find the district court misinterpreted 
the relevant statutes and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings. 
DATED this 24th day of July, 2014. 
State Appellate Public Defender 
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